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Context: The Dreyfus model describes how individuals progress through various levels in their acquisition of
skills and subsumes ideas with regard to how individuals learn. Such a model is being accepted almost
without debate from physicians to explain the ‘acquisition’ of clinical skills.
Objectives: This paper reviews such a model, discusses several controversial points, clarifies what kind of
knowledge the model is about, and examines its coherence in terms of problem-solving skills. Dreyfus’ main
idea that intuition is a major aspect of expertise is also discussed in some detail. Relevant scientific evidence
from cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience is reviewed to accomplish these aims.
Conclusions: Although the Dreyfus model may partially explain the ‘acquisition’ of some skills, it is debatable
if it can explain the acquisition of clinical skills. The complex nature of clinical problem-solving skills and
the rich interplay between the implicit and explicit forms of knowledge must be taken into consideration when
we want to explain ‘acquisition’ of clinical skills. The idea that experts work from intuition, not from reason,
should be evaluated carefully.
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M
odels are conceptual constructs that aspire to
represent real things or processes that to a
large extent are hidden for the senses and to
the ordinary experience. Models have a role to describe,
represent, explain, and ‘translate’ the world. Some good
examples are the Feynman diagrams of electrodynamic
processes, the fluid mosaic membrane, and the DNA
double helix. Although models are partial and just
approximations to the truth, they are not fictional or
conventional at all. They try to represent their referents in
a truthful and objective way with the hope to constantly
improve or replace them with better approximations or
more precise explanations (1).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2, 3) have offered a model of
professional expertise that plots an individual’s progres-
sion through a series of five levels: novice, advanced
beginner, competent, proficient, and expert. In the novice
stage a person follows rules that are context-free and
feels no responsibility for anything other than following
the rules. Competence develops after having considerable
experience. Proficiency is shown in individuals who use
intuition in decision making and develop their own rules
to formulate plans. Expertise is characterized by a fluid
performance that happens unconsciously, automatically,
and no longer depends on explicit knowledge. Thus, the
progression is envisaged as a gradual transition from a
rigid adherence to taught rules and procedures through
to a largely intuitive mode of operation that relies heavily
on deep, implicit knowledge but accepts that sometimes
at expert level analytical approaches are still likely to be
used when an intuitive approach fails initially.
This model, a product of philosophical deliberation
and phenomenological research, was initially adapted
by Benner and other nursing educators to explain the
development of nursing skills (4). However, this was not
without debate, which still remains. Hargreaves and Lane
criticized Benner’s model, a linear model of skill acquisi-
tion that cannot sufficiently explain the everyday experi-
ences of learning (5). Thompson (6), Purkis (7), and
Rudge (8) criticized Benner’s and Dreyfus’ models
because of their apparent absence of social structure or
social knowledge. English pointed out that Benner’s and
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they neglect to specify objective qualifications for
expertise (9). For Effken, the terms ‘expertise’ and
‘intuition’do not have operational definitions: ‘structured
measurement has been elusive because of the complexity
of the domain and the degree to which skill is embedded
in a particular situation’ (10). Gobet and Chassy, in
contraposition to Dreyfus’ and Benner’s phenomenolo-
gical philosophy, suggest an alternative conceptual frame-
work to understand the role of intuition in expertise (11).
Assuming that nurses’ and physicians’ skills are of the
same nature, physician educators have ‘translated’ and
adjusted such a model to explain clinical skills not only in
terms of simple routine tasks but also in terms of the
most symbolic skills, i.e., clinical problem-solving skills
(12). Many authors express their support for this. For
Daaleman, Dreyfus provides a model of knowledge and
skill acquisition that is relevant to the training of
physicians in practical wisdom (13). Batalden, Holmboe
and Hawkins recommend assuming Dreyfus’ ideas as a
framework to understand medical competencies [14, 15].
The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Educa-
tion (ACGME) recommends this model for curriculum-
planning for residency training programs (16).
Contrary to the debate raised in academic nursing
fields, judging by medical publications and recommenda-
tions from academic organizations, the current form of
Dreyfus’ model (2, 3, 1719) is being accepted almost
without explicit criticism from physicians. Thus, although
there may be some debate among clinicians and educa-
tors, such a debate is not evident in published papers. The
Dreyfus model is reaching out to the educative arena and
thus plays an important role in modeling how physicians
acquire clinical skills. This may generate important
consequences for our education. As was mentioned in
this introduction, even models that are born from science
are not complete explanations or perfect approximations
to the truth, and they might be erroneous. Different from
those, the Dreyfus model comes from philosophical
fields; this fact makes even more urgent a critical analysis
and debate. This paper tries to stimulate both.
A brief inventory of the Dreyfus model
Referents
A very important requirement for any model is its
referent, i.e., the object or process referred to by the
model or that which the latter is about (20). The Dreyfus
model postulates that when individuals acquire a skill
through external instruction, they normally pass through
several stages. It is undeniable that such a process implies
the acquiring of some knowledge. This psychological
result of perception, learning, and reasoning constitutes
the Dreyfus model’s primary referent. Because the acqui-
sition of knowledge does not happen in avacuum but in a
very complex organ (the brain), it is desirable that any
hypothetical construct that attempts to explain learning is
defined not only psychologically but also neurologically
(21). Unfortunately, neurological terms appear in the
model only when Dreyfus gestures toward artificial neural
networks to demonstrate that phenomenology can reveal
objective structures of bodily praxis (18, 22). Therefore,
we may say that the brain is a secondary or spurious
referent of such a model.
Postulates and propositions
The Dreyfus model has been proposed in prose style.
Because it is easier to analyze a model when its content is
structured in clear and unambiguous sentences (proposi-
tions) capable of being evaluated as true or false to some
degree, two lists have been created and are presented in
Boxes 1 and 2. They were prepared after a careful review
of Dreyfus’ original works and summarize the model
(2, 3, 1719, 2325). To contrast Dreyfus’ ideas, the
author proposes some statements (listed to the right of
the boxes) that were produced after reviewing various
psychological, neuroscientific, and philosophical works
(1, 20, 21, 2830, 3466, 6879).
History and scientific evidence
Some historical facts may be also interesting. The
original model was not published immediately for
public scrutiny. Four prior reports exist from the US
Air Force (2, 2325), where some observations carried
out on the instruction of jet pilots are described by
Dreyfus. In those reports, few original scientific studies
were cited and standardized protocols were not utilized.
The only recent change in the model is the addition of
two stages (‘master’ and ‘practical wisdom’) (17) to the
five originally proposed (2).
Philosophy
All models have philosophical roots; Dreyfus’ ideas are
based on phenomenology (18), a philosophical doctrine
proposed by Edmund Husserl based on the study of
personal experience in which considerations of objective
reality are not taken into account. This view opposes
scientific realism; for Husserl, the world of things ‘is only
a presumptive reality,’ whereas the subject is the absolute
reality (26). The world is also ‘an infinite idea, a complete
synthesis of possible experiences’ (27). Thus, the reality is
subject-dependent because a thing is a complex of
sensations. Moreover, according to Husserl, introspection
through ordinary experience rather than through experi-
ment, analysis, and modeling can yield deep knowledge of
the world (28). For Martin Heidegger, another key
proponent of phenomenology, ‘the word is the abode of
being’ (29, p. 280), and ‘things become and are only in
the word, in language’ (30). In other words, reality is
constituted in and through discourse. We smell this
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skill acquisition (2) and we discover his explicit adherence
to phenomenology, especially to Heidegger’s existential
phenomenology, in one of the most authoritative texts on
these matters: ‘Being in the world: a commentary on
Heidegger’s ‘‘being and time’’’ (31).
Adaptation to clinical medicine
For the medical field, the model has been adapted with
minor changes. For example, Dreyfus’ main postulates
are that the ‘immediate intuitive situational response is
the characteristic of expertise’ (17, p. 42), and that most
expert performance is ongoing and non-reflective:
‘fluid performance happens unconsciously, automatically,
naturally’ (3, p. 32), and ‘the expert driver generally
knows how to perform the act without evaluating and
comparing alternatives’ (3, p. 33). Medical educators have
proposed a hybrid model where masters are highly
intuitive as well as reflective: ‘the master is the practi-
tioner who self-assesses and self-regulates and reflects in,
on and for action’ (12). This current statement contradicts
the original model. Frequently, it is also stated by
physicians that the model postulates that experts use
intuition where empirical and propositional knowledge
Box 1. Dreyfus’s postulates versus alternative propositions
Dreyfus’ referents Referents
1. Cognitive processes and skills in terms of
implicit knowledge.
1. Cognitive processes and skills in terms of
implicit and explicit knowledge.
2. Brain as a spurious referent. 2. Brain as one of the main referents.
Philosophical background: Phenomenology Philosophical background: Scientific realism
3. Doctrine based on the study of personal
experience in which considerations of objective
reality are not taken into account.
4. The reality is subject-dependent because a
thing is a complex of sensations.
5. ‘The word is the abode of being,’ ‘things
become and are only in the world, in language.’
Reality is constituted in and through discourse.
6. Rhetorical style. No citing of scientific evidence
to ground their proposals.
Dreyfus main postulates
7. Skills are automatic ‘dispositions’ stored in our
minds.
8. Performance of skills is explained exclusively in
terms of implicit knowledge.
9. There are no references to inverse and ill-
defined problems.
10. Acquisition of skills of any kind can be
explained with this model.
11. The acquisition of a skill is viewed as a
gradual transition from rigid adherence to rules,
to an intuitive mode of reasoning that relies
heavily on deep tacit understanding.
12. A high degree of performance is attained
when the individual works intuitively.
3. The thesis that there are real things, the world
exists independently of the knowing subject.
4. The reality can be known objectively and is
best explored scientifically.
5. Science distinguishes between words and their
referents (atoms, stars, people, societies, etc.).
This is why science does not study them
semantically or discursively but experimentally.
6. Models that are representations of real things
must be coherent with scientific evidence.
Alternative postulates
7. Skills are lasting modifications in an individual’s
brain apart from habituation or memory that
enable its owner to face new experiences.
8. There is not a pure skill that allows only
implicit or explicit knowledge to contribute to
performance.
9. Any model of clinical skills acquisition must
recognize that it faces special kinds of problems:
inverse and ill-defined.
10. A model should be specific for skills of
different natures.
11. The acquisition of skill is viewed as a learning
process in two ways: suddenly and gradually. All
kind of stimuli is necessary to facilitate the
trainee’s learning, aside from rigidly following
rules.
12. A high level of performance is attained when
somebody is able to work intuitively, reflectively
and analytically
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proposed the other way around: experts work intuitively
on every problem and only use other types of knowledge
in a few cases when intuition fails.
The following paragraphs will discuss the most con-
troversial aspects the Dreyfus model proposes. The main
body of this paper will go further about the referents and
basically will clarify what kind of knowledge the model is
about and will review its coherence with problem-solving
skills; some relevant scientific evidence from cognitive
science, psychology, and neuroscience will also be re-
viewed. The central idea of intuition as a major definition
of expertise will be discussed in some detail. This is also a
good time to advise that this manuscript does not have
Box 2. Dreyfus’ postulates versus alternative propositions
Dreyfus’ model stages propositions
Novice
1. A novice follows rules.
Alternative propositions
1. Novices are not passive learners who just
follow ‘rules.’
2. Does not feel responsible for anything other
than following the rules.
3. Needs to bring its behavior into conformity with
the rules.
4. Learning is free of context.
Advanced beginner
5. Begins to gain experience in real scenarios.
6. Begins to understand his environment with its
contextual features.
7. Learns ‘instructional maxims’ about actions.
8. Learning still occurs in a detached analytic frame
of mind.
9. Does not experience personal responsibility.
Competent
10. Develops an emotional attachment to the task.
11. Learns ‘guidelines’ (principles formulated by
instructors, which dictate actions in real situations).
12. Competence comes only after considerable
experience.
Proficient
13. Learner uses intuition to realize ‘what’ is
happening.
14. Uses memorized principles called ‘maxims’ to
solve problems and determine the appropriate
action.
15. Prior experiences provide patterns for future
recognition of similar situations viewed from similar
perspectives.
Expert and master
16. Work intuitively on any problem.
17. No longer needs principles.
18. Capable of experiencing moments of intense
absorption in his work.
2. Novices acquire information that allows them
to grasp the nature of skills (understanding is a
prerequisite to learning).
3. Novices need freedom.
4. Learning cannot be detached from context.
5&6. Even at the pre-beginner stage, learners
gain experience and understanding of context;
information, context, and experience cannot be
separated.
7. Maxims are a few explicit ‘prescriptions’ that
are learned at any stage.
8&9. There is always an emotional attachment to
the task even at novice stages; hence there is
always an experience of personal responsibility.
10. Again, affect is always linked to any cognitive
task.
11. Learns to solve inverse problems, but those
cannot be solved following rules, maxims, or
guidelines.
12. Competence comes after learning to solve
inverse problems.
13. A proficient learner, although esteeming its
intuition, knows that it is not enough to realize
‘what’ is happening.
14. A ‘proficient’ performer tries to solve pro-
blems in novel and imaginative ways; he does not
use only specific ‘maxims’ because they are just
general recommendations.
15. Humans are ‘pattern seekers and makers’
even at pre-proficient stages.
16. Experts esteem intuition but are far from
limited to a passive acceptance of it; experts
analyze, critique and elaborate ideas.
17&18. For an expert, intuition only represents a
portion of the problem solving process, which is
always analytical besides intuitive. Experts need
implicit but also explicit knowledge.
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favorable opinions and sympathetic papers of the Dreyfus
model are urged to read several of the publications
included in the references (4, 1215, 32, 33).
Types of knowledge and the Dreyfus model
Because one of the most important referents of the model
is knowledge, it would be of some benefit to review that
concept. There are many kinds of knowledge and several
ways of grouping these kinds into large categories (34).
A division of knowledge that is relevant when analyzing
Dreyfus model is into know-that and know-how. Tradi-
tionally, explicit knowledge or ‘knowing that’ has been
understood as expressible in some languages; it can be
attained easily from any codified information (35). By
contrast, ‘knowing how,’ tacit or implicit knowledge, as it
was proposed by philosopher Michael Polanyi, is not
expressible in some languages. It is considered intuitive 
acquired through practical experience  and as such, is
subjective and contextual, and cannot be readily made
explicit or formalized (36). Polanyi also suggested the
supremacy of such implicit knowledge: ‘While tacit
knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge
must rely on being tacitly understood and applied. Hence
all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge’
(37).
In psychology, the knowledge gained in implicit
learning is defined by using several criteria (38). It is
not fully accessible to consciousness. The learner cannot
provide a full verbal account of what he has learned.
Implicit knowledge does not involve processes of con-
scious hypothesis testing. In addition, implicit knowledge
is preserved in cases of amnesia; thus, implicit learning
relies on neuronal mechanisms other than the hippocam-
pal memory system (39). Implicit knowledge is stored
as abstract  and possibly instantiated  representations
rather than aggregate or verbatim representations. This
knowledge may also be inflexible because of its non-
hippocampal base (40).
Knowledge that represents its content, attitude, and its
holder explicitly is on the higher-order thought theory,
conscious, and is considered explicit. Explicit mental
representation is required to refer in verbal communica-
tion and thus a link emerges between explicitness and
consciousness (41). The explicit processing of knowledge
includes perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes,
such as stimulus selection and search, attention focusing
and maintenance, memorization, computation, decision
making, response selection, and execution (42).
Recently, neuroscientists have proposed the Competi-
tion between Verbal and Implicit Systems (COVIS)
model to explain the brain functional specialization and
localization for the processing of these two types of
knowledge (43). The verbal (explicit) system is mediated
by frontal brain areas, such as the anterior cingulate,
prefrontal cortex, and the head of the caudate nucleus.
The implicit system is mainly mediated by the tail of the
caudate nucleus and a dopamine-mediated reward signal
(44, 45). The role of the basal ganglia in implicit learning
and knowledge has been investigated through the study of
people with Huntington’s or Parkinson’s disease (46, 47).
Besides the COVIS model, there is evidence that the
frontal lobes appear to be involved in the evaluation of
implicit knowledge in making conceptual fluency judg-
ments (38). Hippocampus-dependent memory systems
subserve explicit memory formation (40).
There is considerable evidence in favor of this
‘specialization’ and division of knowledge (38, 41, 48,
49). However, there is not any evidence that sophisticated
skills are performed either without a rich connection of
both neuronal subsystems or without a rich interplay
of both domains of knowledge. Galanter and Smith
observed that even in subjects who are not engaging in
conscious hypothesis testing, they can still notice that
there is a pattern and can develop explicit knowledge of it
(50). Individual learners, during motor skill practice, can
discover the correct solution to a movement problem
using either their implicit, explicit or a combination of
both domains of knowledge; each approach leads to
motor skill learning (51). The serial reaction time task, a
classical example of ‘implicit’ knowledge acquired during
sequence learning, is available for intentional control and
is, in this sense, explicit (52). Automatic and intentional
forms of processing can be brought under intentional
control (53). Besides, explicit knowledge is an important
and active variable that influences problem-solving
processes, especially problem representation. Individuals
who have accumulated considerable explicit knowledge in
a domain represent problems more efficiently than
individuals without extensive knowledge bases (54). In
the face of strongly held explicit beliefs, knowledge
gained through implicit learning is disregarded (55).
Hence, in normal humans, it is difficult to develop a
pure task that allows only implicit or explicit knowledge
to contribute to performance. In particular, sophisticated
skills are fueled by explicit knowledge.
Although the Dreyfus brothers recognize this division
of knowledge, they believe that skills are exclusive
instances of know-how or implicit knowledge: ‘you can
ride a bicycle because you possess something called
‘‘know-how,’’ which you acquired from practice and
sometimes painful experience’ (3, p. 16). The Dreyfus
brothers assert that when we perform a skill, we basically
execute implicit knowledge without a connection to
explicit knowledge. They believe that skills are automatic
dispositions that cannot be readily made explicit (2, 3).
They go further and propose that the net effect of
learning is intuition and define it in terms of implicit
knowledge: ‘when we speak of intuition or know-how, we
are referring to the understanding that effortlessly occurs
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shall use intuition and know-how as synonyms’ (3, p. 28).
In summary, Dreyfus and Dreyfus define skills at expert
level almost exclusively in terms of implicit knowledge.
A critical point is to accept whether or not clinical
problem-solving skills are implicit in nature or if they are
predominantly dependent upon implicit knowledge. As
we reviewed above, it is difficult to develop a task
exclusively in terms of implicit knowledge. Even more
importantly, clinical problem-solving skills are also
instances of explicit knowledge. The clearest cases of
explicit knowledge of a fact are representations of one’s
own attitude of knowing that fact. Knowledge capable of
such fully explicit representation provides the necessary
and sufficient conditions for conscious knowledge (41).
This is the case when a physician evaluates a patient.
Although he is not aware of all of the cognitive steps
needed to make a diagnosis, he needs to be conscious of
at least of the following events: characterization of a
patient’s symptom, valuation of a patient’s sign, and
solicitation of a diagnostic test. Furthermore, physicians
explicitly provide a representation (diagnosis) and express
the degree of accuracy or inaccuracy and can judge their
representations to be true, false or undecided. Hence, it is
reasonable to accept that making a diagnosis also
subsumes an explicit dimension of knowledge. Therefore,
a model that does not respect the complex and rich
interaction between both domains of knowledge will have
difficulty explaining skills that are not just routines but
instead very complex tasks, i.e., finding solutions to
problems.
Inverse problems and clinical problem-solving
skills
We will start the discussion of this section by pointing
out that there is not only one type of problem, but
several types. Most problems can be classified into direct,
well-defined problems and inverse, ill-defined problems.
Direct or forward problems are of the following type:
given C (causes)0E (effects), find E (effects), where (0)
symbolizes the causal relationships (29, pp. 145164).
These types of problems call for analysis, or progressive
reasoning, either from premises to conclusions or from
causes to effects. In contrast, an inverse problem is a
more complicated problem of the following type: given
the clinical data E (effectssymptoms) and the
acceptable causal hypothesis C10E, C20E, ... ,C n0E,
find the original cause C. Inverse problems require
synthesis, or regressive reasoning, from conclusions to
premises or from effects to causes. Inverse problems also
are ill-defined problems in the sense that a simple
solution may not exist, there may be more than one
solution, or a small change in the problem leads to a big
change in the solution (56).
Well-defined and direct problems have a clear path to a
solution. The problem may be solved by using a set of
recursive operations or algorithms (57, 58). In contrast,
the cognitive processes involved in the solution of
ill-defined problems are far more complicated and still
ill-understood. In the case of ill-defined problems, all
aspects of problem formulation are challenging. Most are
fuzzy problems, often difficult to delineate and even
harder to represent in a way that makes them solvable
(59). In addition, inverse problems imply a novelty for
each case, and expertise should reflect an ability to react
to situations that experts have never encountered before.
In this context, problems cannot be solved ‘automati-
cally’ or only ‘intuitively.’
The Dreyfus model has been derived from observation
of the performance of experts, such as jet pilots and
dancers, experts who are used to tackling direct problems.
Is it correct to use this model also to explain the
performances of experts who are used to tackling inverse
problems? It is plausible that often the skills involved in
solving direct problems are not the same as those
involved in solving inverse problems. Think about the
skills needed to solve this short list of inverse problems:
to ‘guess’ the intention of a person from his/her behavior,
to discover the authors of a crime knowing the crime
scene, to ‘imagine’ an internal body part from the
attenuation in intensity of an X-ray beam, to guess
the premises of an argument from some of its conclu-
sions, or to diagnose a sickness on the strength of its
symptoms. The investigation of those problems does not
proceed downstream, from premises to conclusions or
from causes to effects. Working on all those problems
involves reversing the logical or causal stream. In
medicine, physicians face inverse problems all of the
time. In fact, the typical diagnosis problem is not the
direct problem of inferring syndrome from disease, but
the inverse problem of guessing disease from symptoms
(60). Anyone who wants to propose a model to explain
how we develop clinical problem-solving skills must
recognize carefully that the skills used to solve inverse
problems are of a different nature than the skills used to
solve direct problems. A model should be specific for
skills of different natures; the Dreyfus model is not
specific enough.
Rules and context
In the Dreyfus model, a novice should memorize rules
and should not feel responsible for other things: ‘to
improve, the novice needs monitoring, either by self-
observation or instructional feedback, so as to bring his
behavior more and more completely into conformity with
the rule.’ (2, p. 7). Besides, the Dreyfus model supports
the idea that at proficient and competent levels, perfor-
mers should have developed ‘personal guidelines and
maxims’ in order to be able to deal successfully with tasks
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Dreyfus propositions are right? Is that the way we learn
skills of explicit or even of tacit nature? Is it a good idea
to memorize rules at novice stages? Do proficient and
competent physicians solve diagnostic problems using
just a set of ‘personal’ rules and maxims?
Early problem-solving research proposed the ‘general
problem solver model.’ In this model the solution of a
problem is conceptualized as a movement between two
states: a starting state, named ‘problem space,’ and a final
state named ‘goal state’ (58). There are ‘rules of transi-
tion’ which refer to those functions that move the system
from one state to another, and there are also heuristics
tools, rules that determine which moves are to be made in
the problem space. Although this model gives great value
to the use of rules, it should be recognized that these
components are well suited for solving well-defined and
direct problems, where the space and transitions between
states are unambiguous (59). However, the model offers
no solution whatsoever for dealing with inverse problems,
for which there do not exist simple rules to solve them.
In medicine, although there are clinical guidelines and
algorithms available that can help physicians deal with
some problems, physicians acknowledge that these ‘rules’
are just general recommendations. Besides, physicians use
‘guidelines’ after they have transformed an inverse
problem into a direct one. This is after diagnostic
hypotheses have been generated. However, there is not a
recipe to generate hypotheses. Furthermore, physicians
use heuristic rules, such as Occam’s razor regarding
parsimony, but these ‘rules’ are general recommenda-
tions. They are explicit (not personal), and still it is not
well known what impact they have on clinical problem-
solving skills (61).
Rules are instructions for doing something, and even
when they may be constructed as a mapping of possible
actions (algorithms), they do not describe or explain any
particular event or thing because they prescribe what to
do. If we accept that knowledge has a transferable
content that has been encoded and externalized in
cultural artifacts, such as a book, then we should
recognize that rules are not the sole element of that
content, because knowledge consists of thousands of
concepts, propositions, and theories. This knowledge
allows us to grasp the nature of disease; understanding
is a pre-requisite to learning. The development of clinical
reasoning skills for medical students is dependent on
basic science achievements (62, 63). Novices, who rely on
biomedical knowledge, solve complicated diagnostic
problems with more success (64).
Believing that students should only memorize rules has
a dark side and can cause deleterious consequences.
When rules are available for everything, novices can
spare the effort of imagining a different way to solve an
inverse problem. Hence, they would tend to proceed to
solve problems in a rather mindless way. We should
reflect on the fact that to learn, students need all kinds of
stimuli, such as propositional from books and experience.
But they also need freedom to develop the talent to
produce diagnostic hypotheses by spotting, inventing,
and sometimes guessing.
Other elements to analyze are Dreyfus ideas that
learners at pre-competent stages have a complete ignor-
ance of the ‘context,’ and that the education at this level
should be decontextualized: ‘normally, the instruction
process begins by decomposing the task environment into
context-free features which the beginner can recognize
without benefit of experience’ (2, p. 7). Contrary to such
an idea, we should acknowledge that everything in our
world, including concepts, is interrelated. Learning, as
any other event, happens under specific conditions and
should not be detached from the real experience. Medical
students always face the context. Of course, at the
beginning, there is not enough insight into every detail.
However, students’ minds are not like computers follow-
ing a program; they have some ideas, some approaches,
and some knowledge of the context. For example,
medical students can generate numerous diagnostic
inferences, even without considerable clinical experience
(65, 66). How can they do that if novices like them
‘ignore’ the context? Accumulating experience is not a
passive recording. Learning is creative in the sense that it
is new and not automatic to the individual. Even at the
pre-beginner stage, learners gain experience and under-
standing of the context. Information, context, and
experience cannot be separated.
Intuition
The Dreyfus brothers propose that intuition is the
endpoint of learning and a key characteristic of expertise:
‘the expert pilot, having finally reached this non-analy-
tical stage of performance, responds intuitively and
appropriately to his current situation’ (2, p. 12). Hubert
Dreyfus describes a master as one with a lot of experience
who produces almost instantaneously appropriate per-
spectives, who thinks intuitively, not analytically, andwho
ceases to pay conscious attention to his performance
turning it unconsciously: ‘the expert, like masters in the
‘‘long Zen tradition’’ or Luke Skywalker when respond-
ing to Obi Wan Kenobi’s advice to use the force
‘‘transcends’’ ‘‘trying’’ or ‘‘efforting’’ and ‘‘just re-
sponds’’’ (67, p. 22).
Adults often learn to drive a car, type, play chess, ski,
etc. In most cases we perform such skills intuitively,
quickly, unconsciously, and ‘just respond.’ These every-
day skills are relatively easy to acquire, at least to an
acceptable level. It is plausible that some steps required to
perform a simple task are so fast that we consider them
on an unconscious level even though we are alert and
oriented. Neuroscience tries to explain that there are two
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tion: one is constituted of heavily interconnected neurons
with long-range axons (named workspaces) and the
others are system sets of specialized neuronal processors
(perceptual, motor, memory, evaluative, and attentional)
with short axons (68). The latter ones are not enough to
perform tasks that require great effort, so the workspace
neurons are activated, making the effort conscious. This
mobilization is greater with complex cognitive tasks
(68, 69).
However, the popular conception that some simple
everyday skills are performed fast and ‘unconsciously’
can explain neither the performance of difficult tasks nor
the acquisition of sophisticated skills (70). In the case of
problem-solving skills, empirical studies have demon-
strated a distinction between expert and novice problem
representation in terms of the time spent on various
stages of the problem-solving process. Contrary to the
idea that experts dedicate less time than novices, Lesgold
(71) found that experts spent more time than novices
determining an appropriate representation of the
problem. Experts spent more time comparing their
knowledge to the information they needed to discover
in order to best represent the problem.
Even skilled rapid motor production, as in typing, is
not simple nor is completely automatic. Studies showed
that expert typists look ahead to prepare for what comes
next. They acquire complex representations and skills to
anticipate future actions (72). Something similar happens
in music, where the mark of expert performance is the
ability to control one’s performance and its results;
there is not such a thing as an automatic and immediate
response. Expert music performance requires several
different representations: ‘imagined music experience’
(desired performance goal), ‘playing a piece of music’
(how to execute the performance), and ‘listening to the
played music’ (hearing one’s performance) (73). The
resulting music performance should not be seen as a
fixed and automated sequence of motor actions. It should
be viewed as a flexible, controllable outcome based on
these representations (70).
Consequently, it is hard to believe that the whole
clinical problem-solving process is intuitive in the sense
that it is unconscious, effortless, and automated.
Although the use of ‘pattern recognitions’ and ‘illness
scripts’ can happen in an automatic way, especially when
data or a prior experience triggers a possible diagnosis,
this explains only one state of the whole problem-solving
process. Good physicians, although esteeming intellectual
intuition because of its suggestive power, know that it can
be dangerous: first, because intuition does not have
demonstrative force, and second, because intuition is
never fine enough. Intuition, as a very fast and almost
instant inference, consists of showing rather than demon-
strating; in proving in a brief and imperfect way, and in
rendering plausible the hypothesis that has been invented.
It is a kind of rudimentary reasoning that uses incom-
plete evidence, visual images, and analogies (prior
experiences) rather than complete data, refined concepts,
and detailed inferences (74). A diagnosis formulated in an
intuitive way will have to be worked out in a rational way
and then tested by the usual procedures. This is because
the suspicion generated by the illness scripts and pattern
recognitions are not proof of a diagnosis. Further, this is
why we use a lot of auxiliary tests and image studies.
Expert clinicians intentionally avoid any tendency toward
automatization as they often lose control of many
relevant aspects of a clinical encounter. Ericson called
this ‘deliberate practice’ (70).
There is evidence that experts use two modes of
thinking: analytic (hypotheticdeductive) and non-analy-
tic (pattern recognition), even in perceptual specialties
(7578). Both modes of thinking are part of a continuous
process. Expert physicians do not use analytic reasoning
only after a failed attempt with non-analytic reasoning or
the other way around. Clinical medicine is one of the
more complicated and challenging professions; it is very
simplistic to explain problem-solving processes starting
and ending with intuition. Many diagnostic errors are
due to overconfidence and heuristic availability, and some
errors occur during non-analytic reasoning (79). Intui-
tion, because it is brief and readily accomplished and
grasped, must be expanded to be validated.
Implications and conclusions
Any model is a representation of a thing, and in this
representation two elements play important roles: the
represented and the representing things. With this pair of
elements we can make diverse kinds of representations:
factualfactual (a scale model), factualconceptual (a
theoretical model), factualsemiotic (a scientific text),
and semioticfactual (a text illustration) (1). The acquisi-
tion of skills is a learning process and is obviously factual.
Hence the Dreyfus model attempts to be a factual
conceptual model, a theory or at least an outlook of
how we acquire diverse skills. Any factconcept corre-
spondence is of course difficult and not of the one-to-one
type. However, because it tries to be truthful, a theory
must attempt to be coherent and related to the facts.
Although the Dreyfus model is not taken strictly as a
‘prescription,’ it is plausible that its descriptive face is
influencing us to generate a worldview, a general outlook
of how we learn and teach medicine. Every worldview has
an effect on our actions and policies. And here is the
point of major implication, because this model can
influence educative policies, recommendations, and
guidelines. This model can also generate unhappy contra-
dictions. For example, it has been said that the Dreyfus
model provides us with a framework for consistency
within the evaluation system (80). How can this model
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suggests explaining physicians’ performance in terms of
implicit knowledge and intuition? By definition, if
implicit knowledge is not expressible in some language,
then it is inaccessible to evaluate. Certainly we need more
debates and we need to evaluate this model not only in
light of philosophical but also of scientific considerations.
Although the Dreyfus model could partially explain
the ‘acquisition’ of some skills, it is another matter as to
whether it can explain the acquisition of clinical skills.
The occurrence of inverse problems and the rich interplay
between the implicit and explicit domains of knowledge
must be taken into consideration when we want to
explain ‘acquisition’ of clinical skills. The idea that the
net effect of education and training in medicine is that we
start developing intuition about what we are doing must
be revised and evaluated carefully.
Using this model in a prescriptive way must elicit a
more critical eye to see if novices must receive an
education where rules are the only important things to
learn in a decontextualized environment. Finally, we must
acknowledge the complexity of all the processes implied
in learning. We cannot merely accept the temptation to
oversimplify these complex processes, and ignore inten-
tionally or not information from science, in particular
from cognition, psychology, and neuroscience.
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